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would like to thank Ben for presenting a careful
and thought-provoking paper. It is really two
papers. The first part is positive. Ben notes that
simple macroeconometric models based on a
Taylor rule omit any reference to money and asks
whether or not there is any problem with this.
The second part is normative. He asks whether or
not it is dangerous to set interest rates in response
to expected inflation. In both cases, his answer is
“yes” in theory and “no” in practice.
I will begin with the first part. Ben’s point can
be seen by looking at the following simple “new





The variables represent log deviations from a steady
state. Superscript e denotes expected values. The
first equation is an “expectational” IS curve. It comes
from the Euler equation for consumption and there-
fore relates current output, y, to future output and
the real interest rate. The second equation repre-
sents the pricing decisions of firms in the economy.
Firms are assumed to fix prices over an interval of
time. Hence inflation, π, is high if firms expect in-
flation in the future or if firms are responding to
excess demand in the present. The third equation
represents money demand. Real balances, m–p,
depend positively on output and negatively on the
nominal interest rate, R. The model is closed with
an equation describing monetary policy and an
initial condition for the lagged price level. If this
policy rule is of the Taylor variety, that is, if the Fed
sets the nominal interest rate in response to output
and inflation such as 
(4)
then output and inflation are determined solely by
equations (1), (2), and (4). Money and the price level
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play no direct role. The price level can be deter-
mined from equation (2) and the initial condition,
pt–1. Given the price level, the money supply can
be determined by equation (3). But these are after
thoughts; the main action is in equations (1), (2),
and (4).
Is this a problem? My first reaction was to think
“no.” The model is well specified. Money works in
the way that it is supposed to. It is just that with
this particular policy rule, one can solve the model
without money. After all, the same recursivity is
present in the old Keynesian IS-LM model.
The old Keynesian IS curve and the new
Keynesian IS curve, however, are really very differ-
ent objects. The old Keynesian IS curve represents
supply and demand for goods. The new Keynesian
IS curve reflects intertemporal optimization. In
order to see why money might or might not matter
in this case, it is useful to review the derivation of
equation (1). We begin with the consumption Euler
equation: 
.
This equation reflects optimal consumption
smoothing. It relates the marginal utility of con-
sumption today, Uc,t, to the marginal utility of con-
sumption tomorrow. If in addition we assume that
utility is separable between consumption, on the
one hand, and leisure and money, on the other: 
and if we assume that there is no investment so
that all output is consumed, Y=C, we arrive at the
relation (1).
From this derivation, it is clear that (given the
real interest rate and consumption tomorrow) money
might matter for output in two ways: (i) money shifts
the utility of consumption and (ii) money shifts the
relationship between consumption and output.
Seen in this way, one can think up dozens of
theories by which money should enter equation (1).
It is interesting to note that Pigou’s real balance
effect is not one of them. The Pigou effect is a wealth
effect. It effects ct only through ct+1 and has no
independent effect on the consumption Euler
equation.
A partial list of amendments follows:
• Non-separable utility: Here changes in the
money supply affect Uc directly.
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• Transactions costs: Here the money supply
affects the efficiency with which dollars may
be translated into consumption and hence
the total cost of goods.
• Liquidity constraints: When the constraints
bind, the Euler equation does not hold and
changes in the money supply may relax the
constraint.
• Cash-in-advance constraint: In Svensson
(1985), for example, a relaxation of the con-
straint has a direct effect on consumption in
many states of the world.
• Segmentation of the goods and asset markets:
In many models of the liquidity effect, equa-
tion (1) does not hold for agents temporarily
cut off from the asset market.
• Lending view: Here money affects investment
through bank balance sheets and hence the
gap between consumption and output.
Ben focuses on transactions costs. He supposes
that purchases absorb ψ(C,M) in resources each
period where ψ is increasing in C and decreasing in
M. He does not find this channel important. To see
why, consider the consumption Euler equation
amended for transactions costs. Since reducing
consumption by a unit reduces utility by C–γ, but
increases resources by 1+ψc, we replace Uc with
C–γ/(1+ψc). Log-linearizing and noting log
(1+ψc)∼ψc:
Money matters if it shifts ψc,t–ψc,t+1. Since the
transactions cost is small, one would not expect
the change with respect to money of the first dif-
ference with respect to time of the derivative with
respect to consumption of the transactions cost to
be large. Although it could be.
Ben shows that for plausible parameterizations
this effect is small. In a similar vein, Peter Ireland
(2000) investigates the effect of non-separability
between money and consumption in the utility
function with similar results. Although it is just
speculation, I would guess that this transactions
effect of money is more important in cases in which
the payments mechanism is under stress, such as
during high inflations. During more stable times,
the constraint models or the lending view make
more plausible cases for the inclusion of money in
the New Keynesian IS curve.
Now let’s turn to the second topic of Ben’s talk:
the danger of using Taylor rules based on expected
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inflation. Consider again the simple new Keynesian
model,
where, for simplicity, we have removed the shocks
and have specified that policy sets the nominal
interest rate proportional to expected inflation. To
see the potential problem, use the first and third
equations to remove R and use the second equation
to remove yt and yt
e
+1; the result is 
If µ is high enough or if µ is negative, then this
equation has real non-zero solutions of the form
πt=λtπ0. Typically there are two of these λ, one
greater than 1 in absolute value and one less than
1 in absolute value. Like the homogeneous solutions
to a differential equation, these solutions may be
tacked on to any particular solution that we find to
the model.
While mathematically precise, this way of
explaining the indeterminacy is not very enlighten-
ing. It does not explain why the indeterminacy
arises and whether agents might actually fall into
the trap of believing in one of these so-called sun-
spot or bubble solutions. To get a better handle on
these issues I found it useful to rewrite the model
in terms of the behavioral rules that agents follow.
This requires taking a step back to the baseline
model that these three equations represent. That
model is a model of monopolistic competition in
the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz together with Calvo-
style price rigidity.
The behavioral relations are: 
Bars represent averages across agents. As before,
the first equation follows from consumers’ Euler
equations. Each consumer sets his consumption,
yi,t, equal to his expected future consumption less
b times his expected real interest rate. The second
equation represents the optimal pricing choices of
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are increasing in the current price level, pt, current
output, y –
i,t, and the firm’s expectations of future
inflation, πe
i,t+1. Firms care about future inflation
because they do not get the opportunity to change
their price each period. The parameter θ represents
the probability that a firm must keep its price un-
changed. Note that the expectation of relevance is
the firm’s expectation of others’ price changes. To
get from this equation to equation (2), we note that
a fraction, 1–θ, of firms change their prices each
period so that
The last equation describes the rule of the monetary
authority. They may choose their own expectation
of inflation if they wish.
There are several strategic complementarities
present in this model. First, there is an intratemporal
pricing complementarity: price increases by some
firms lead others to desire price increases. This is
not a source of multiple equilibria in the present
context. A 1 percent increase in prices by all firms
that are adjusting prices, leads to a (1–θ) percent
increase in the price level and therefore a (1–θ)
percent increase in the desired price of each firm.
There is also an intertemporal pricing comple-
mentarity: Expectations of future inflation lead firms
to raise prices today. As noted above, the firms rais-
ing their prices tomorrow are different than the ones
acting today. This raises an important point. The
multiple solutions to equation (5) all arise because
one group of agents believes that another group of
agents will do something in the next period, and
not because individuals believe that they themselves
will act in a certain way tomorrow.
The central bank’s interest rate rule has an
impact on this intertemporal complementarity.
How this works depends on how the central bank
forms its expectations and how the economy reacts
to its announcements. One possibility is that the
central bank responds directly to the private sector’s
expectations of inflation, πe
b,t+1=π –e
i,t+1. In this case
we get equation (5) after imposing rational expecta-
tions and symmetry across agents.
There are, however, other possibilities. It is
possible that the central bank uses its own model
to generate its expectations and announces these
expectations to the market along with its interest
rate at the beginning of each period. If agents heed
these announcements, they may coordinate agents
pp p tt i t =+ − () − θθ 1 1 ,
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on a single equilibrium of the central bank’s choos-
ing, and thereby eliminate solutions to equation (5)
that are undesirable from the bank’s perspective.
It is also possible that agents ignore the central
bank’s announcements and go with their own




own internal forecast, but that private agents choose
πe
i,t+1≠πe
b,t+1. Solving for the expectations of private
agents yields: 
.
The homogeneous part of this difference equation
has non-zero real roots like equation (5). In fact it
is the same as (5), but with µ=–1. In this case, by
sticking stubbornly to its inflation forecast while
private agents choose expectations that are differ-
ent, the central bank finds itself insufficiently
responsive to bubbles in inflation that may develop.
Note in this case, we are not imposing that the cen-
tral bank has rational expectations, only that the
private agents do.
Are these problems serious? The values of λ
that arise when µ is large are negative. This implies
that the inflation oscillates along the bubble path.
It is hard to imagine the conditions under which
these solutions would arise. It requires one group
of agents to raise prices in anticipation that the
next group would cut prices, and the next group
would raise them again. A negative value of µ, on
the other hand, leads to positive values for λ. Here
the explosive root has a certain intuitive appeal,
whereas the stable root, although mathematically
just as valid, appears a bit far-fetched. One can
imagine agents believing that things are getting out
of hand and believing that others believe likewise.
It is less likely that agents believe that future actions
will cause the inflation rate to converge geometri-
cally to the no-bubble solution. In any case, the easy
way to avoid such situations is either to be credible
or to set interest rates sufficiently responsive to
agents’ own expectations of inflation.
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